Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-ndw9j Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-07T19:20:19.449Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Three-Valued Ethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Jonathan Cohen
Affiliation:
University College, Dundee.

Extract

I Wish to suggest both that three (and not two) values are often used for the appraisal of moral judgments and also that there are some generally shared purposes which would be furthered if this usage became even more common. In doing this I shall by-pass two problems which have been not infrequently discussed in recent years:

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1951

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

page 210 note 1 Ethics and Language, 1945, p. 90.

page 210 note 2 In this usage it may have descriptive force at the same time, as Professor Stevenson’s second pattern of analysis has shown, but this is always supplementary.

page 211 note 1 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume xxii, p. 109.

page 211 note 2 This seems to have been done by Mr. Kneale, W. in Philosophy, vol. 25, No. 93 (April, 1950), p. 149 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 212 note 1 Accordingly, it is misleading to claim that logical analysis is irrelevant to the question “One morality or many?”: cf. W. B. Gallie in Philosophy of October, 1949, p. 322. It helps to clarify the question, even if it does not answer it.

page 213 note 1 Ethics and Language, p. 137.

page 213 note 2 In Religion and the Rise of Capitalism.

page 215 note 1 Ethics and Language, pp. 138 and 274.

page 216 note 1 Ethics and Language, pp. 113 and 152 ff.

page 217 note 1 In Mind, October, 1949, p. 469 ff. In Mind of April, 1950, p. 223 ff., Mr. Baier has chosen to interpret Mr. Hampshire’s words in such a way that his suggestion appears either “meaningless” or “grotesquely untrue” or confused. However, I take Mr. Hampshire to be as sane as Mr. Baier, and I think it only fair to assume that he is not talking nonsense or paradox. I have interpreted him accordingly.

page 218 note 1 In the same article.

page 219 note 1 Ethics and Language, p. 174 ff.

page 219 note 2 Mr. S. Toulmin (Proc. Ar. Soc, 1949–50, p. 155) has suggested that the proper reply to a captious question such as this would be “And what have you in mind as an alternative?”

page 224 note 1 I am indebted to Mr. Eric Gillman on this point.