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Some Points in the Philosophy of Locke

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

A. C. Ewing
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Extract

The more elementary student used to be left with four main impressions of Locke. Firstly, he was an “empiricist”; secondly, he occupied an inconsistent intermediate position on the road to Berkeley and Hume; thirdly, he was pre-eminently the philosopher of common sense; fourthly, he committed the epistemological error of teaching that our only objects of knowledge were ideas in our mind which copied reality. All these dicta contain an important element of truth, but are misleading by reason of the excessive emphasis which has been placed upon them.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 12 , Issue 45 , January 1937 , pp. 33 - 46
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1937

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References

page 33 note 1 Essay, Bk. IV, Ch. 8.

page 34 note 1 IV, I, 2.

page 35 note 1 The word idea is, of course, very ambiguous. I discuss the meaning of this term on top of p. 36 to end of article.

page 35 note 2 II, 7, 8; 26, 1.

page 36 note 1 Essay, IV, 10, 3.

page 36 note 2 Vide Locke’s First and Third Letters.

page 38 note 1 Essay, II, 25, 5.

page 41 note 1 II, 8, 24.

page 41 note 2 IV, 1, 1.

page 42 note 1 Locke often confuses an idea of a quality with the quality of which it is an idea.

page 42 note 2 IV, 2, 14.

page 42 note 3 IV, 1, 7.

page 43 note 1 Essay, IV, 5.

page 45 note 1 Gibson, , Locke’s Theory of Knowledge, p. 22.Google Scholar

page 46 note 1 Gibson, , Locke’s Theory of Knowledge, p. 13.Google Scholar