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Recent Critics of Mill's Qualitative Hedonism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 September 2016

Ben Saunders
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Abstract

Two recent critics of Mill's qualitative hedonism, Michael Hauskeller and Kristin Schaupp, argue that Mill's distinction between higher and lower pleasures was largely unsuccessful. They allege that Mill failed to demonstrate that some pleasures are lexically preferred to others, and indeed that this can be shown false by the fact that most people would not renounce supposedly lower pleasures, such as chocolate or sex, even for greater amounts of higher pleasures, such as reading or opera. I respond that many of these criticisms rest on uncharitable assumptions or interpretations of Mill's position. We need not suppose that Mill was even trying to do the things he supposedly failed to do. However, considering these objections may lead us to a more plausible interpretation of Mill's views, according to which the quality of pleasures, along with their quantity, contributes towards happiness. There is no need to suppose that ‘higher pleasures’ must be lexically preferred to lower ones, or even to be dogmatic about which pleasures are higher.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 91 , Issue 4 , October 2016 , pp. 503 - 521
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Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2016 

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References

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41 Of course, the committee's preferences may be affected by institutional incentives. For instance, as of 2014, the UK's periodic ‘Research Excellence Framework’ (REF), which both allocates government research funding and features in numerous league tables, considers only four outputs from each researcher in each assessment period. For this purpose, someone with four 3* articles and nothing else is preferable to someone with three 3* articles and any number of 2* articles. However, given that 2* work is still ‘recognised internationally in terms of originality, significance and rigour’ (http://www.ref.ac.uk/panels/assessmentcriteriaandleveldefinitions/), it is not obvious that the former is a better philosopher, even though they score more highly in the REF.

42 Op. cit. note 6, 211.

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44 Op. cit. note 37, 103.

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47 Op. cit. note 4, 270. The example is originally from Anderson, op. cit. note 23, 9.

48 Op. cit. note 4, 272–3.

49 Op. cit. note 6, 215, emphasis added.

50 Although his defence of individual freedom also allows for this; no one should be forced to experience a variety of pleasures, if they choose to devote themselves as wholly as possible to one. Although, for an account of Mill's harm principle that permits some interference with self-regarding choices, see Ben Saunders, ‘Reformulating Mill's Harm Principle’, Mind (forthcoming).

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59 Op. cit. note 6, 213.

60 Op. cit. note 6, 211.

61 It is worth noting that Harriet Taylor regarded sex as manifesting what is highest and best in human nature; see McCabe, Helen ‘Harriet Taylor Mill’ in Macleod, C. and Miller, D. E. (eds) A Companion to Mill (Wiley-Blackwell, 2017), 112–125 Google Scholar, at 119.

62 Op. cit. note 6, 211.

63 Op. cit. note 4, 272.

64 Op. cit. note 6, 211–2.

65 Op. cit. note 3, 445–6. Hauskeller appears to treat ‘pleasure’ and ‘happiness’ as interchangeable, but Mill would insist that the fool's life – even if more pleasant – is not actually happier, only more content (op. cit. note 6, 212). The truly happy life is the one we should want for ourselves, which may be the more dignified or nobler one. Cf. Finnis, John's characterization of happiness as signifying a fullness of life, in Natural Law & Natural Rights, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 96 Google Scholar.

66 Op. cit. note 6, 211.

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69 I thank Dale Miller and Chris Macleod for stimulating me to revisit these issues, and for their comments on related earlier work, Helen McCabe for discussions of Mill's relationship with Harriet, and Chris Armstrong for helpful prompting.