In 1920 Bignone published an Italian translation of the writings and fragments of Epicurus in Laterza's library of Ancient and Mediaeval Philosophers which in many respects added to and improved upon Usener's classic collection, of Epicurea. He has since then zealously prosecuted these studies, and arrived at some very interesting conclusions which he has given out in two volumes published lately.1 His starting-point is the observation that the writings of Epicurus often have a polemical tone, and not only rebut the accusations of adversaries who misinterpret the new doctrine, but are often directed also against those preceding philosophers who denied to pleasure a stable and certain nature on which a system of ethics could be based. Bignone has set himself the task of particularizing these anonymous predecessors, and thereby bringing the Epicurean polemic into more striking relief. I t was easy and safe to start from the standpoint that Epicurus in his rehabilitation of pleasure had to oppose Plato and the Platonists, but at what Platonists in particular did he take aim? In answering this question Bignone has been able to make use of recent Aristotelian studies, especially those of Jaeger, which have thrown much light on the first phase of the Stagirite's philosophy, of a purely Platonic inspiration. As is well known, some exoteric dialogues belong to this phase, such as the Eudemos, the Protrepticon, and On Philosophy, which have to a large extent disappeared, though it has been found possible to reconstruct a few scattered fragments of them. The great scholastic works which reveal the full independence and maturity of Aristotle's genius have eclipsed them in the memory of posterity. But originally there were only these dialogues, the only ones published, to make Aristotle's thought known to the public outside the peripatetic school. The scholastic writings on the other hand remained unknown until the time of Sulla. What wonder, then, if Epicurus, in combating Platonism, had in mind these dialogues, which give out the fundamental conceptions of Platonism in a more decisive and dogmatic form than that of the Platonic dialogues?