^{page 248 note 1} There is an important distinction between “right” = what is to be done, i.e. what is required for efficient handling of the situation, and “right” = what ought to be done, i.e. what the Moral Law demands in the situation. This distinction between the standards of efficiency and of morality is admirably expounded by Croce in his Philosophy of the Practical. It is, I think, slurred by John Grote in his analysis of the faciendum, in ch. ii of his Treatise on the Moral Ideals, a work to which I am much indebted in these articles.

^{page 248 note 2} I cannot agree with Broad, Dr. (Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. iii, No. II, p. 295)Google Scholar that the only possible meaning of “intrinsically right” is “fitting to all situations.” In morally right acts, the fittingness is to the Moral Law, which is the form to which the right act supplies content. The Moral Law is willed in willing the act. Whether what we judge to be right is really right, in the sense of being an adequate embodiment of the law, is another story. We shall see later that no act of finite will can be, in this sense, really right.

^{page 248 note 3} See Moore, , Journal of Philosophical Studies, pp. 316–23Google Scholar, and Broad, loc cit. When Dr. Moore says in regard to the Christian precept “Love your enemies,” that “to love certain people, or to feel no anger against them, is a thing which it is quite impossible to attain directly by will, or perhaps ever to attain directly at all,” while “your behaviour towards them is a matter within your own control,” he seems to me to be seriously underrating the extent to which feelings are controllable by will. Control of thoughts and emotions constitutes four-fifths of the moral life. I cannot accept his distinction between ideal rules, which it would be my duty to fulfil, if I were able, and rules of duty which I am actually able to fulfil. There is a sense in which no duty can be perfectly fulfilled, and there is a sense in which all duties lie within our power. Otherwise, the term duty loses its meaning. Further, I shall try to show later that acts cannot be judged morally apart from the temper of mind in which they are done (i.e. apart from the motive, in one sense of that very ambiguous term). If this be so, the act judged includes the feeling, and judgments on acts alone or on feelings alone are abstract and, as such, defective moral judgments.

^{page 250 note 1} See ProfessorMoore's, Ethics (Home University Library), p. 148Google Scholar, and Journal of Philosophical Studies, pp. 312–313. A “wrong” act would of course always be identical with an act that “ought not” to be done, but neither of the two equally right acts would be obligatory to the exclusion of the other. The possibility of two equally right acts is bound up with Professor Moore's doctrine that right means conduciveness to good. This view, which is widely held, will be considered in the second of these articles.

^{page 250 note 2} See his article in Mind, N.S. 81, p. 24.

^{page 250 note 3} Treatise on the Moral Ideals, p. 147.

^{page 250 note 4} Republic, 430E–431B.

^{page 250 note 5} Republic, 475B; 490AB; 581B.

^{page 252 note 1} Aristotle, , Metaph., 994Google Scholar; Eth. Nic, 7. 2.1094a (Ross, , Selections, pp. 51, 219Google Scholar).

^{page 252 note 2} See Moore, Principia Ethica, ch. i.

^{page 252 note 3} Principia Ethica, pp. 83–84.

^{page 252 note 4} Ibid., pp. 98–99.

^{page 252 note 5} It implies, of course, that pleasure, or riches, are regarded as possessed of value.

¹ This point will be discussed in detail in the next article.

^{page 255 note 1} Wordsworth: Ode to Duty.