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Object Perception, Perceptual Recognition, and That-Perception Introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 September 2009

Vincent Hope
Vincent Hope
Affiliation:
Royaume-Uni
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Abstract

The philosophy of perception currently considers how perception relates to action. Some distinctions may help, distinguishing object perception from perceptual recognition, and both from that-perception. Examples are seeing a man, recognising a man, and seeing that there is a man. Perceiving an object controls self-location by its recognising an object, which depends on memory of how it looks, controls looking for it and interacting with it, or not, and that-perceiving controls saying that an object exists. Perception controls action. Milner and Goodale, Jacob and Jeannerod, and Noë are considered.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 84 , Issue 4 , October 2009 , pp. 515 - 528
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2009

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References

1 See, for example, Peacocke, Christopher, ‘Scenarios, concepts and perception’, Essay 5, The contents of experience, Essays in perception ed. Crane, Tim, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)Google Scholar. See also Bennett, M.R. and Hacker, P.M.S., Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, especially chs 4 and 10 (Blackwell, 2003)Google Scholar. Noe, Also Alva, Action in Perception (Cambridge Mass, MIT, 2004).Google Scholar

2 See Clark, Andy, ‘Visual Experience and Motor Action: Are the bonds too tight?’ The Philosophical Review, 110, No 4, Oct 2001CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Milner, A. David and Goodale, Melvyn A., The visual brain in action, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995)Google Scholar. See also Jacob, Pierre and Jeannerod, MarcWays of Seeing (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Jonathan Harrison, ‘The logical function of ‘that’, or truth, propositions and sentences', Philosophy 79, 67–96.

5 Op.cit., 68.

6 The Visual Brain in Action, 2.

7 Ibid.

8 A view repeated by Goodale in ‘Action Insight: The Role of the Dorsal Stream in the Perception of Grasping’, Neuron 47 4 August 2005, 328–329.

9 Ways of seeing, 135.

10 Op.cit., 157.

11 Op.cit., 145.

12 Op.cit., 139.

13 Op.cit., 144.

14 Op.cit., 145.

15 Op.cit., 161.

16 Op.cit., 159.

17 Op.cit., 191.

18 Ways of seeing. 192.

19 Op.cit., 178.

20 Op.cit., 182.

21 Noë, Alva, Action in Perception (Cambridge Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 2004)Google Scholar.

22 Op.cit., 1.

23 Action in Perception, 3.

24 Op.cit., 182.

25 Op.cit., 184.

26 Op.cit., 198.

27 Op.cit., 199.

28 Op.cit., 77.

29 Op.cit., 200.

30 Op.cit., 198, 206.

31 Action in Perception, 3.

32 Op.cit., 1.

33 Op.cit., vii.

34 Op.cit., 107.