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The Neurophilosophy of Pain

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

G. R. Gillett
G. R. Gillett
Affiliation:
University of Otago
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Extract

The ability to feel pain is a property of human beings that seems to be based entirely in our biological natures and to place us squarely within the animal kingdom. Yet the experience of pain is often used as an example of a mental attribute with qualitative properties that defeat attempts to identify mental events with physiological mechanisms. I will argue that neurophysiology and psychology help to explain the interwoven biological and subjective features of pain and recommend a view of pain which differs in important respects from the one most commonly accepted.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 66 , Issue 256 , April 1991 , pp. 191 - 206
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1991

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References

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