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Laws of Nature and Individuals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 September 2020

Ranpal Dosanjh
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Abstract

Individuals (like the Earth or a biological species) are often the subject of generalizations of various special sciences. The traditional argument is that there can't be laws about such individuals, since the law statements would have to contain local predicates (refer essentially to a particular time, place, object, or event). Marc Lange argues that, despite local predication, there can be laws about individuals. This paper argues, on the contrary, that there can be no such laws – not because of local predication, but because the laws would discriminate among material systems on non-qualitative grounds. I rely on the principle that qualitatively identical systems under one set of laws must evolve in the same manner. If there could be laws about individuals, nothing would guarantee that the principle is satisfied. My argument is illustrated by a thought experiment inspired by Strawson's massive reduplication argument.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 96 , Issue 1 , January 2021 , pp. 49 - 72
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Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2020

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