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Induction, Conjunction Introduction, and Safety

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 July 2023

Bin Zhao
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Abstract

Depending on whether we are somewhat tolerant of nearby error-possibilities or not, the safety condition on knowledge is open to a strong reading and a weak reading. In this paper, it is argued that induction and conjunction introduction constitute two horns of a dilemma for the safety account of knowledge. If we opt for the strong reading, then the safety account fails to account for inductive knowledge. In contrast, if we opt for the weak reading, then the safety account fails to accommodate knowledge obtained via the method of conjunction introduction.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 98 , Issue 4 , October 2023 , pp. 477 - 483
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of Philosophy

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