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The Human Person in Contemporary Philosophy1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Frederick C. Copleston
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Extract

I. In the early part of the sixth century a.d. Boethius defined the person as “an individual substance of rational nature” (rationalis naturae individua substantia). This definition, which became classical and was adopted by, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas, obviously implies that every human being is a person, since every human being is (to employ the philosophical terms of Boethius) an individual substance of rational nature. If one cannot be more or less of a human being, so far as “substance” is concerned, one cannot be more or less of a person. One may act as a human person ought not to act or in a way unbefitting a human person; one may even lose the normal use of one's reason; but one does not in this way become depersonalized, in the sense of ceasing to be a person. According to St. Thomas, a disembodied soul is not, strictly speaking, a person, since a disembodied soul is no longer a complete human substance; but every complete human substance is always and necessarily a person.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 25 , Issue 92 , January 1950 , pp. 3 - 19
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1950

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References

page 5 note 1 Unscientific Postscript, p. 85Google Scholar.

page 5 note 2 Ibid., p. 108.

page 5 note 3 The Philosophy of Existence, p. 89.

page 5 note 4 Ibid., p. 1.

page 7 note 1 With Marcel the idea of person is, I should say, much more in evidence than that of existence. But then Marcel resigns himself to being called, rather than claims to be, an existentialist.

page 8 note 1 Révolution personnaliste et communautaire, p. 67.

page 8 note 2 Politique de la personne, p. 56.

page 8 note 3 Manifeste au service du personnalisme; Esprit, October, 1936.

page 9 note 1 Politique de la personne, pp. 52–3. De Rougemont is, incidentally, a Protestant, while Mounier is a Catholic.

page 10 note 1 Equivoques du personnalisme and Tâches actuelles d'une pensée d'inspiration personnaliste; Esprit, February, 1947 and November, 1948.

page 10 note 2 In attempting to understand the well-meant efforts of certain French Christians to find a bridge between Christianity and Marxism one must, of course, bear in mind the difference between the French and English political scenes, however one may finally evaluate these efforts.

page 10 note 3 The Person and the Common Good, p. 27.

page 12 note 1 L'Être et le Néant, p. 516.

page 13 note 1 L'Être et le Néant, p. 520.

page 13 note 2 The Philosophy of Existence, p. 63.

page 13 note 3 L' Être et le Néant, p. 520.

page 13 note 4 Ibid., p. 76.

page 13 note 5 Homo viator, p. 26.

page 14 note 1 Homo viator, pp. 32–33.

page 14 note 2 The Philosophy of Existence, p. 30.

page 15 note 1 Freedom and the Spirit, pp. 117 and 121.

page 15 note 2 De l'Acte, p. 189.

page 16 note 1 De l'Acte, p. 185.

page 16 note 2 Ibid.

page 16 note 3 Obstacle et Valeur, p. 321. The “double cogito” refers to the moi public and the moi intime.

page 16 note 4 Ibid., p. 322.

page 17 note 1 Obstacle et Valeur, p. 321.

page 17 note 2 Traité de morale générale, p. 481.

page 17 note 3 Obstacle et Valeur, p. 194.

page 17 note 4 Ibid., pp. 345 and 344.