The present state of ethical theory and practice is disquieting. Objectivism, in all its varieties, is unconvincing, and subjectivism, hedonic or emotive, is intellectually incredible and socially intolerable. No one is ethically content—except the dogmatist and the sceptic, who act willy nilly with the exponents of “might-cum-persuasion makes right.” Can we find a happier middle region between these inhospitable poles? Perhaps the very limitations of human valuation will provide the ground that ethics requires.

Let us begin by considering the conditions which must hold if ethical action is to be possible:

1. Only if the agent can provide a justifying reason for his choice of action can he claim to act ethically. For ethical action is a species of purposive action, and to act purposively entails the ability to give justifying reasons for one's choice of action. (“Justifying” here is to be understood as “putatively justifying”). Thus ethical action presupposes putatively grounded ethical judgment.

2. Justifying reasons must be acknowledgeable by all competent judges, i.e. by all persons who (I) are acquainted with all relevant knowledge of the nature and consequences of the alternative courses of action, (2) allow as far as possible for congenital, cultural and idiosyncratic bias, (3) are capable of sane and serious reflection, and (4) are able to make survey of their experience and to draw conclusions from it. For the judgment “the action A is ethically preferable to its alternatives B (in this situation)” entails “A ought to be done” which in turn entails “every competent judge is capable of acknowledging the ground of the judgment ‘A is ethically preferable to B’ and consequently would be able to set himself to perform A as an ethical act, (i.e. an autonomous act for which the agent can provide a justifying reason).” We can assure ourselves of this requirement of acknowledgeability by observing that whenever we resolve, and not merely settle, an ethical disagreement, we have achieved not only a factual, predictive, valuational and attitudinal agreement between the disputants, but a joint acknowledgment of the ground of the ethical judgment. Without this, the agreement could not be said to be ethical, whether the judgment be right or wrong or neither, but merely an agreement to disagree, ethically. Unless ethical disagreement is in principle resolvable, ethical judgment is impossible, for we should be unable to claim that our choice ought to be acted upon.