Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-8bhkd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-09T15:31:53.625Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Denial of the Synthetic A Priori1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Oliver A. Johnson
Oliver A. Johnson
Affiliation:
University of California(Riverside).
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In his essay “Logical Empiricism”, in the anthology Twentieth Century Philosophy, Professor Feigl writes: “All forms of empiricism agree in repudiating the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge.” 2 Schlick makes the same point even more forcibly: “The empiricism which I represent believes itself to be clear on the point that, as a matter of principle, all propositions are either synthetic a posteriori or tautologous; synthetic a priori propositions seem to it to be a logical impossibility.”3 The denial of synthetic a prioris is a major thesis of the logical empiricist position, being found in the writings of most of the leaders of the movement.4 The reason for its importance is fairly clear. It provides a formula on which the empiricists can base their critique of traditional philosophy. To use Ayer's phrase, denial of the synthetic a priori results in “the elimination of metaphysics”. The philosophical tradition to which the empiricists are opposed and whose “metaphysics” they wish to eliminate can be called, somewhat loosely, rationalism.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 35 , Issue 134 , July 1960 , pp. 255 - 264
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1960

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

page 255 note 2 Feigl, H., “Logical Empiricism’, in Twentieth Century Philosophy, ed. Runes, D. D. (New York, 1947), p. 387.Google Scholar

page 255 note 3 Schlick, M., ‘Is There a Factual A Priori?” in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, eds. Feigl, H. and Sellars, W. (New York, 1949), p. 281.Google Scholar

page 255 note 4 Cf., for example, Ayer, A. J., Language, Truth and Logic, 2d. ed. (London, 1948), pp. 38, 72, 86–7;Google ScholarCarnap, R., Philosophy and Logical Syntax (London, 1935), P. 75;Google ScholarReichenbach, H., The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951), pp. 38–9.Google Scholar

page 255 note 5 For the remainder of the paper I shall use the term “empiricist” to refer to one who denies synthetic a prioris and “rationalist” to refer to one who affirms them. This usage is, I think, compatible with the traditional meanings of these terms.

page 257 note 1 Cf., for example, Langford, C. H., “A Proof that Synthetic A Priori Propositions Exist”, The Journal of Philosophy, 46 (1949), 20–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Ewing, A. C. “The Linguistic Theory of a priori Propositions”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series XL (1939–1940), 239 ff.Google Scholar

page 260 note 1 To the objection that I have begged the question by assuming propositions rather than sentences, I should reply that the argument applies as well to sentences as types (which are abstract) in contrast to concrete tokens.