¹ Stout, G. F., ‘Universals Again’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplemental Volume 15 (1936), p. 14.Google Scholar

² Pears, D., ‘Incompatibility of Colours’ in Flew, A. (ed.) Logic and Language (Second Series) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Press, 1973), p. 119.Google Scholar

³ Westphal, J., ‘The Complexity of Quality’, Philosophy 59 (1984), p. 458.Google Scholar

⁴ Westphal, p. 466.

⁵ Even being able to speak of differences and similarities across distinct colour-patches, as we shall see, does not invalidate the claim that those colours are simple.

⁶ Likewise in Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit example. We should not conclude the figure to have both a duck and a rabbit as its components. Rather, the alleged complexity turns on two different acts of seeing-as.

⁷ For more on this theme, see Prior, A., ‘Determinables, Determinates,and Determinants’ Mind, 58 (1949).Google Scholar

⁸ Prior, p. 6.

⁹ Westphal, p. 457.

¹⁰ I wish to thank Brad Cohen and Andrew Mills for helpful suggestions and comments.