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Collective Responsibility—Again

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

David E. Cooper
Affiliation:
Pembroke College.

Extract

I shall not try to deal with all of the interesting points Mr. R. S. Downie (Philosophy. Jan. 1969) raises against my paper, Collective Responsibility (Philosophy. July 1968). I shall deal with (1) a matter of clarification, (2) one of the lesser issues between us, and (3) the major issue between us.

(1). On one point, surely, Downie has simply misunderstood what I said. He claims that my criticisms do not work against the common view that Responsibility is analytically tied to blameworthiness; but only apainst the claim that Responsibility is analytically tied to the efficacy of blame. Well, I hope so. For it was meant to be clear that I was only attacking the view, to be found in Nowell-Smith's Ethics (and also among some Utilitarians), that Responsibility is to be analysed in terms of the efficacy of blame and punishment. Far from attacking the view that Responsibility is analytically tied to blameworthiness, I quoted, with full approval, a passage from Brandt, according to which Responsibility entails the “fittinsness” of blaming and praising attitudes.

Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1969

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