^{page 219 note 1} Gladstone, 's edition (the smaller one of 1897) of Butler's Works, Vol. I, p. 328Google Scholar.

^{page 220 note 1} Cf. Letters of David Hume, ed. Greig, , I, 27Google Scholar. I owe my knowledge of the relations between Hume and Butler to MrMossner, E. C.'s book, Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason, pp. 156 ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 221 note 1} Gladstone, II, 5.

^{page 221 note 2} Ibid., 150.

^{page 221 note 3} Dissertation on Virtue (Gladstone, , I, 329–30, but printing “or” for “and”)Google Scholar.

^{page 221 note 4} Ibid. (Gladstone, I, 334).

^{page 221 note 5} Analogy, Part I, ch. vi (Gladstone, , I, 124)Google Scholar.

^{page 221 note 6} E.g. Selby-Bigge, , British Moralists, Vol. II, p. 10, pp. 31–2, and elsewhereGoogle Scholar.

^{page 221 note 7} Sermon II (Gladstone, II, 46).

^{page 222 note 1} Gladstone, II, 44.

^{page 222 note 2} Sermon II (Gladstone, II, 55).

^{page 222 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 222 note 4} Ibid. (Gladstone, II, 45).

^{page 222 note 5} Ibid. (Gladstone, II, 55).

^{page 223 note 1} Sermon IV (Gladstone, II, 71).

^{page 223 note 2} Sermon XII, footnote (Gladstone, II, 190).

^{page 223 note 3} Dissertation on Virtue (Gladstone, , I, 337)Google Scholar.

^{page 224 note 1} Analogy, Part I, ch. vi (Gladstone, , I, 123–4)Google Scholar.

^{page 224 note 2} Ibid. (Gladstone, I, 125).

^{page 224 note 3} Gladstone, II, 51.

^{page 225 note 1} Butler does not consistently distinguish the two characteristics of “rightness” and “fitness” by retaining each of these words exclusively for each of them. He sometimes calls the second “what is right and reasonable as such.” Clearly he was not aware that his statements in general necessitate that they are different characteristics. It is perhaps a mistake to try to obtain a completely consistent view from Butler; but if we do attempt this (and I think it is worth attempting), then we must, I believe, say that the view I suggest is implied by most of what Butler says on this topic.

^{page 225 note 2} Gladstone, I, 125.

^{page 225 note 3} Part II, ch. viii (Gladstone, I, 300).

^{page 225 note 4} Cf. p. 223, above.

^{page 226 note 1} This tag could be applied to Sidgwick too. Sidgwick agrees that plain men use the intuitionist method of determining their duties, but holds that the only fully reasonable and fully consistent method is that of Utilitarianism. Some critics of Sidgwick miss the mark by failing to see this important aspect of his work. Sidgwick himself protests against the misunderstanding in the Preface to the Second Edition (7th ed., p. x), yet it still continues: I have heard more than one philosopher speak of Sidgwick as if he were a hedonistic Utilitarian simpliciter, and criticize him, as one would criticize Bentham, by referring to the non-utilitarian judgments of the plain man.

^{page 226 note 2} Butler's combination of the two views is not so very different from the modified combination which I have ventured to suggest in Chap. VI of The Moral Sense.

^{page 226 note 3} When among angels. To Hobbes he gives no quarter.

^{page 226 note 4} P. 220, above.

^{page 226 note 5} Some evidence for my interpretation of Butler is perhaps to be found in the views of Shaftesbury, whom Butler obviously admired and to whom he owed the notion of morality as linked up with the notion of an internally related system. Shaftesbury appears to hold (1) that we perceive moral attributes by a moral sense, and (2) that there are nevertheless objective moral characteristics antecedent even to God, which are “eternal and immutable” (the phrase obviously comes from the rationalists, though probably not from Cudworth himself, whose book was not published until 1731 many years after his death).

^{page 227 note 1} Part I, ch. v (Gladstone, I, 102).

^{page 227 note 2} Ibid. (Gladstone, I, 106).

^{page 227 note 3} Ibid., ch. vi (Gladstone. I, 128).

^{page 227 note 4} Sermon III (Gladstone, II, 60).

^{page 227 note 5} Sermon II (Gladstone, II, 45).

^{page 227 note 6} Ibid. (Gladstone, II, 45–6).

^{page 227 note 7} Ibid. (Gladstone, II, 46).

^{page 228 note 1} Analogy, Part II, ch. viii (Gladstone, , I, 301–2)Google Scholar.

^{page 229 note 1} Gladstone, II, 36.

^{page 229 note 2} Ibid., 7–8.

^{page 229 note 3} Cf. p. 223–4, above.

^{page 229 note 4} Cf. p. 224, above.

^{page 230 note 1} Apropos of Whewell, Mr. Carritt tells me of the proof-reader who corrected

“Books in the running brooks,

Sermons in stones”.

to

“Stones in the running brooks,

Sermons in books.”

Mr. Carritt himself believes (as he has informed me in a letter) that Butler is thinking of Aristotle's ñ òρεκτικòς νος ñ òρεξις διανοητικń, and that “the chiasmic oxymoron is intentional,” expressing contempt for the controversy. This is an attractive suggestion, but if it is right why does Butler go on to say “or, which seems the truth, as including both”? The figure, if it is such, would at least cease to be “oxy.” However, the sentence as a whole certainly does express contempt for this sort of controversy.

A. E. Taylor, who seems to take somewhat seriously Whewell's absurd suggestion, gives a defence of the original reading which seems to me over-subtle and unnecessary (Philosophical Studies, p. 299)Google Scholar.

^{page 231 note 1} Cf. Reid's strictures on the use of the word “sentiment” to mean a feeling in the moral theories of Hume and Adam Smith:

“Authors who place moral approbation in feeling only, very often use the word sentiment, to express feeling without judgment. This I take likewise to be an abuse of a word. Our moral determinations may, with propriety, be called moral sentiments. For the word sentiment, in the English language, never, as I conceive, signifies mere feeling, but judgment accompanied with feeling. It was wont to signify opinion or judgment of any kind, but, of late, is appropriated to signify an opinion or judgment, that strikes and produces some agreeable or uneasy emotion.” Active Powers, Essay V, ch. 7. Reid in fact goes a little too far, as I have noted on p. 153 of The Moral Sense.

For my interpretation of the phrase “sentiment of the understanding,” cf. Richard Price who uses the same phrase (Review of Morals, p. 129 of my editionGoogle Scholar) to mean an act of knowing; this is clear from the fact that he is there controverting those who will not allow that rightness is known by the understanding.

^{page 231 note 2} The fremquent expression “reflex approbation” refers, I believe, to the “reflection” Locke talks of, i.e. introspection.

^{page 232 note 1} Sermon II (Gladstone, II, 52).

^{page 232 note 2} Gladstone, II, 57.

^{page 232 note 3} Sermon III (Gladstone, II, 64).

^{page 232 note 4} Sermon V (Gladstone, II, 83).

^{page 232 note 5} Sermon XI (Gladstone, II, 158).

^{page 233 note 1} Cf. pp. 224–5, above.

^{page 234 note 1} My apparently paradoxical conclusion about Butler's treatment of conscience receives some support from the verdict of Sir Leslie Stephen in his History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century.

“Conscience is God's viceroy; our nature means ‘the voice of God within us’…. The constitution of man, like the constitution of his dwelling-place, points unmistakably to his Creator. In both cases we recognize the final causes of the phenomena” (Vol. II, pp. 48–9).

“The conception of a self-evidencing power seems to involve a vicious circle. Exclude the idea of right from the supremacy, and the statement becomes inaccurate; admit it, and the definition includes the very thing to be defined. Conscience must, in some way, derive its credentials from some, other authority than itself…. Butler's escape from the vicious circle really consists in his assumption that the conscience represents the will of God. He is blind to the difficulty, because he conceives the final cause of conscience to be evident…. A blind instinct, ordering us to do this and that, for arbitrary or inscrutable reasons, is entitled to no special respect so long as we confine ourselves to nature. But when behind nature we are conscious of nature's God, we reverence our instincts as implanted by a divine hand, and enquire no further into their origin and purpose. No suspicion occurred to him that the marks of a divine origin which he supposed himself to be discovering by impartial examination, might be merely the result of his having stated the problem in terms of theology. As in the ‘Analogy’ his argument depends on assuming suffering to be supernatural punishment, so here it depends on assuming the promptings of conscience to be supernatural commands” (Vol II, pp. 50–1).

^{page 234 note 2} Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 55Google Scholar.

^{page 234 note 3} I leave open the question whether all knowledge of necessity is in some sense analytic, and whether moral principles depend ultimately on postulates.

^{page 235 note 1} Mr. McPherson has sent me some valuable comments on a first draft of this Appendix, and I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to him.

^{page 235 note 2} Gladstone, II, 112.

^{page 236 note 1} In this connexion I think Mr. McPherson has established the important distinction he finds in Butler between genuine and supposed self-love.

^{page 236 note 2} Preface to Sermons (Gladstone, , II, 21–2)Google Scholar.

^{page 236 note 3} Ibid. (Gladstone, II, 23). My italics.

^{page 236 note 4} Ibid. (Gladstone, II, 24).

^{page 236 note 5} Sermon I (Gladstone, II, 33).

^{page 236 note 6} Ibid. (Gladstone, II, 43).

^{page 237 note 1} Sermon II (Gladstone, II, 51). My italics.

^{page 237 note 2} Sermon IX (Gladstone, II, 131).

^{page 237 note 3} In his letter of comments on this Appendix.

^{page 237 note 4} Gladstone, II, 31. Like Reginald Jackson, Mr. McPherson rightly draws attention to “in some degree.”

^{page 237 note 5} Jackson, Reginald was almost equally emphatic: Philosophy, Vol. XVIII (1943), p. 123Google Scholar.

^{page 237 note 6} Gladstone, II, 88.

^{page 237 note 7} Ibid, 188.

^{page 237 note 8} Sermon I (Gladstone, II, 33–4).

^{page 237 note 9} Ibid (Gladstone, II, 35).

^{page 238 note 1} Sermon I, (Gladstone, II, 34–5 footnote).

^{page 238 note 2} Ibid. (Gladstone, II, 38).

^{page 238 note 3} Gladstone, II, 163

^{page 238 note 4} Ibid., 181.

^{page 238 note 5} Ibid, 169.