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Alienation and Self-realization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Kai Nielsen
Affiliation:
University of Calgary

Extract

Self-realizationist theories are among the classical attempts to develop a comprehensive normative ethical theory. Plato and Aristotle, in giving classical statements of such theories, argue that a man's distinctive happiness, a man's distinctive flourishing, will only be realized when he realizes himself, i.e. when he achieves to the fullest possible degree his distinctive function. And to achieve one's function is to develop to the full those capacities which are distinctive of the human animal. In doing this we are being most truly ourselves and in doing this we are doing what it is our own nature to do. Men who cultivate to the fullest that which men and only men have will be the happiest men and in so acting they will realize themselves most fully; they will achieve their maximum potential or their fullest distinctively human growth. To so realize oneself is the final end of all moral activity. It defines what is to constitute ‘the good life’ and what is to count as ‘a good man’.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1973

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References

1 Field, G. C., Moral Theory (London: Methuen Publications, 1966), 75.Google Scholar

2 This stress on contemplation and this conception of rationality also fits badly, as Bernard Williams observes, with his stress on practical wisdom and the importance of citizenly activities. Williams, Bernard, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 60.Google Scholar

3 Siegler, Frederick, ‘Reason, Happiness and Goodness’, in Aristotle's Ethics: Issues and Interpretations, ed. by Walsh, James J. and Shapiro, Henry J. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1967), 36.Google Scholar

4 Baier, Kurt, The Moral Point of View (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1958)Google Scholar and Nielsen, Kai, ‘On Moral Truth’, in Studies in Moral Philosophy, ed. by Rescher, Nicholas (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968).Google Scholar

5 MacIntyre, Alasdair has importantly criticized such conceptions in his Against The Self-images of The Age (New York: Schocken, 1971), 173190.Google Scholar