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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Extract

The great philosophers have generally held that there was some kind of interdependence between philosophy and practice. An unexamined life, they have maintained, is not worth living; and if there is to be anything to examine, life must first be lived, i.e. a practical experience is a propaedeutic to philosophy. But although Plato, for instance, thought that the task of government could be well performed only by the philosopher, he does not seem to have thought that fifteen years’ practical experience had any beneficial influence on the philosopher’s subsequent work of philosophic contemplation. Aristotle explicitly prefers the theoretical to the practical life, and the resultant divorce of theory and practice leads to quietism and so to ethical scepticism.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1937

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References

page 414 note 1 Moore, : Principia Ethica, p. 149.Google Scholar

page 414 note 2 See e.g. Ross, : The Right and the Good, pp. 155156.Google Scholar

page 414 note 3 See Collingwood, : Human Nature and Human History, in the Proceeding of the British Academy, vol. xxiiGoogle Scholar, and, Fite, : The Living Mind, esp. pp. 2455.Google Scholar

page 420 note 1 In the sense implied by Aristotle: E.N. vii, 13, 6.

page 420 note 2 In this section on the nature of evil, I am greatly indebted to Collingwood, : Essay on Philosophical Method, esp. pp. 8284.Google Scholar

page 420 note 3 On the difference between reason and ratiocination, see e.g. de Burgh, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 19361937, p. 8.Google Scholar