In the course of modern philosophy, there have been several attempts to demonstrate the existence of ultimately simple objects by purely logical methods. One of the most recent of such attempts forms part of the foundation of Wittgenstein's logical doctrine. As Wittgenstein has, until quite recently, been considered the authoritative source of Logical Positivism, an examination of his supposed demonstration of logical simples is propaedeutic to an evaluation of the method of the school.

In the following, limiting ourselves to two objects—the processes X and Y—we will compare three kinds of regularities in their specific manifestation in physics: (1) interaction; (2) causality; and (3) functional dependence. In considering as objective all the regularities which are inherent in things and material processes themselves, and in considering causality and functional dependence merely as one-sided abstractions of interaction, which in its turn is an abstraction from the universal interconnection of things, we avoid such an arbitrary definition of causality as, for instance, the possibility of exact prognosis which leads to the negation of causality. We also avoid placing functional dependence above causality.

In our previous writings we have outlined a mathematical theory of biological phenomena. In our systematic construction of “mathematical biology,” similar in its aims to mathematical physics, we have started with the fundamental unit,—the living cell. After having established a physico-mathematical theory of the fundamental properties of the cell, we have studied the interaction of several cells. This led us into two different fields. On the one hand we studied such interactions of cells, which determine the form of cellular aggregates, constituting multicellular organisms. On the other hand we studied different types of functional interactions, which determine the reactions of the aggregate as a whole to different environmental changes. While the first field leads us eventually to the theory of organic form, the second brings us to the physico-mathematical theory of behavior.

The necessity for a clear understanding of the dual character of scientific method (verified observation on the one hand and theoretical analysis on the other) and of its applicability in social study as in the physical and biological sciences, can hardly receive too much emphasis at the present stage of development. Such an understanding, however, merely provides the proper beginning or orientation in the organization of any scientific discipline. That which is a common element in all scientific procedure can hardly serve to differentiate one science from another.

It is the contemporary belief, in American legal circles at all events, that law or jurisprudence, whatever it may have been in the past, has now the status of a social science. This is an assumption easier to make than to substantiate, and in view of the increasing insistence upon this point, it is now appropriate to inquire whether or not it possesses a tangible foundation. This requires a consideration of the distinctive characteristics of social science, the determination whether or not jurisprudence exhibits these characteristics, and, if not, if it is possible for it to assume them. It will be convenient to begin, briefly and concisely, with an examination of the characteristics of modern legal thought.

Scientific method interests the linguist not only as it interests every scientific worker, but also in a special way, because the scientist, as part of his method, utters certain very peculiar speech-forms. The linguist naturally divides scientific activity into two phases: the scientist performs “handling” actions (observation, collecting of specimens, experiment) and utters speech (report, classification, hypothesis, prediction). The speech-forms which the scientist utters are peculiar both in their form and in their effect upon hearers.