Among recent developments in the anthropological sciences, hardly any have found so much attention and led to so much controversy as have the views advanced by the late Benjamin Whorf.

The hypothesis offered by Whorf is,

“that the commonly held belief that the cognitive processes of all human beings possess a common logical structure which operates prior to and independently of communication through language, is erroneous. It is Whorf's view that the linguistic patterns themselves determine what the individual perceives in this world and how he thinks about it. Since these patterns vary widely, the modes of thinking and perceiving in groups utilizing different linguistic systems will result in basically different world views” (Fearing, 1954).

“We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar. … We cut up and organize the spread and flow of events as we do largely because, through our mother tongue, we are parties to an agreement to do so, not because nature itself is segmented in exactly that way for all to see” (Whorf, 1952, p. 21)

Several aspects of the work of George H. Mead have attracted a rather considerable amount of attention in recent years. The attention devoted by several disciplines to the relevant aspects of his work, however, has not involved an explicit focusing upon his philosophy of science. This is deemed regrettable, at least by this writer, in view of the fact that Mead's philosophy of science appears to be a rather substantial conceptualization of the actual research process.

Biologists have recently found it useful to give a prominent place in their theories to the concept of a plant or animal population. Genetics, ecology, paleontology, and especially the theory of evolution have been able to make notable advances as a result of employing the concept in their interpretations and inferences. The concept has not, however, first been rigorously defined and then put to work. That is rarely the way fruitful scientific notions develop. On the contrary, in most discussions the term “population” has a large degree of vagueness about it. This is due in part to the fact that the term has been taken over from ordinary language and employed in a number of novel contexts. But some of the vagueness also seems to be an unavoidable consequence of the immensely intricate phenomena to which the term refers. In any case, the role played by the concept of a population in evolutionary theory makes even a brief inquiry into its meaning worthwhile. The present paper is concerned with such an inquiry. What I wish to do is, first, to review the major ways in which the concept has been used by biologists in connection with recent formulations of the theory of evolution; and secondly, to comment on a few misleading issues which may arise if care is not taken to observe certain logical and linguistic distinctions.

1. Introduction. Now that operationalism has evolved from a battle cry of a militant minority to a widely accepted maxim of scientific method, and has in the process lost much of its initial intransigeance, it seems time to devote more attention to the application of operational analysis to the social sciences. This paper attempts to explicate some basic concepts in the behavioral sciences, both individual and social, namely, ‘control’ and ‘unfreedom,’ as well as the concepts by which they will be defined, such as ‘persuasion,’ ‘constraint,’ ‘deprivation,’ and ‘punishment’. This analysis will enable us to ascertain with greater precision some of the rather intricate connections which exist between these relations.

Phenomenology, currently the most active philosophical movement on the European scene, has shown persistent concern for psychological problems and principles, and for the science of psychology in general. This concern has taken the form of various attempts to amend psychology according to phenomenological precepts and methods with the intent of providing it with a new metaphysical basis. Recent examples of this trend are the textbook of Snygg and Combs (20) and the two books published in France by the philosopher, Merleau-Ponty (16, 18).

The “International Congress for the Philosophy of Science” was held in the week of August 23–28, 1954 at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, Switzerland. The Institute enjoys a very high reputation as one of the foremost schools of its kind in the world. It was at this Institute that Albert Einstein taught at the beginning of his academic career. The Congress was arranged as the Second Congress of the “Union Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences” (U.I.P.S.) which has its permanent seat in Paris, France. The first Congress of the U.I.P.S. was held in Paris in 1949. It was then that the “International Forum of Zurich” was asked to organize five years later the Congress of Zurich.

The problems of operations research, optimized at the tactical and strategic level, have a domain of interest much broader than many of its earlier suboptimization problems. Its appeal to scientific method requires the construction of a model from which predictions can be made. This model must have the comprehensive character of those proposed by philosophy and the sciences. Such a model is available in the form of war gaming, a traditional military training vehicle transformed in such a way as to make it a research tool of great power and flexibility and which can assume a multitude of forms. The war game as a new research tool, when applied to the important problems at a high level of optimization, carries with it the excitement of a pioneering venture and the promise of contributions of greatly increased importance to the development of military science.

The Einstein law of velocity addition is well-known. Consider three inertial reference frames S, K, and M, with X axes parallel in the same sense. Let K have velocity v1 along the X axis of S, and M have velocity v2 along the X axis of K. Then, according to the Einstein formula, the velocity v3 of M along the X axis of S is

If v2 is the velocity of an object at rest in M as measured by an observer in K, then v3 is the velocity of the same object as measured by an observer in S. The formula is valid for a change in reference frame of the observer.