There will be more philosophy than physics in this paper for I make no pretentions to an expert knowledge of physics. Categories are, however, in my line; and here I may have some insight.

In the theory of relativity much depends upon the conception of the velocity of light in empty space. Such is the expression Einstein employs. If this velocity is to be a quantity independent of the choice of the inertial system to which it is referred, no absolute meaning can be assigned to the conception of the simultaneity of events that occur at points separated by a distance in space. Rather a special time must be allocated to every inertial system. “It is in consequence of this that space and time are welded together into a uniform four-dimensional continuum.” Thus succinctly does Einstein express the c hoice in his article in the Encyclopedia Britannica.

Morphology is the science of form. The word is used in various scientific disciplines, e.g. in geography, linguistics, etc., but it is most frequently employed to denote that part of Biology which deals with the forms of organisms. The mere description of spatial relations, however, scarcely constitutes a science. It may be hard to say by what property science is distinguished from other human endeavors, but that factual description does not suffice is generally admitted. To establish relations between facts may be taken as a preliminary answer. It would still remain to define these relations. The answer to that question, however, depends largely on the particular brand of philosophy to which an author happens to subscribe. Most answers have been formulated by focusing attention largely on physics and related sciences.

In our times of social eruptions not only the hierarchies of life but also those of coralled knowledge have become floating and therefore, papers presenting ideas of a certain generality must become accustomed to forsaking the habit of defining at the start the basic concepts. Renouncing a definition of the Webster type we will start with a very provisional definition of psychotherapy, hopeful that once more it might prove true that lifting one's eyes to the general will be more fruitful, if it is preceded by a stage of intimate knowledge of the particulars. Moreover, it is hoped that from such at the same time intimate and “philosophical” knowledge of one particular field a wholesome criticism, nay enriching effect might arise. It is the problems of detail that in our times have definitely turned to philosophy and it is these same problems which philosophy should delve into in its own interest.

The theory of specifying an organization of meaning by reporting the relationship of elements of meaning to a specified central meaning bears the coined name, ‘corism’.

'Meaning’ is here used as a collective noun and its referent is assumed to be an organized body of increments of meaning rather than a mere heterogeneous aggregation. Many such organized bodies with which we are concerned in this article are called either concepts or concept structures. The specification of the theory called ‘corism’ will be expanded by an illustration in which it is applied to recording and communicating meaning as organized in selected concepts and concept structures. The selected bodies of meaning relate to ‘operations called scientific’.

There is a story, perhaps apocryphal, concerning a visit made by Alfred North Whitehead to the University of Virginia. He drove from the station to the campus in a horse drawn vehicle under the guidance of a garrulous “darkie”. Said the driver, “Are you a traveller?” “Yes”, replied Whitehead. … long silence …. “What do you sell?”. “Wit and wisdom”, replied Whitehead. … long silence. … At the end of the drive the darkie remarked, “I've never seen a traveller before who wouldn't show me some of his goods.”

In what follows our purpose is to make clear the reasons which lie back of Whitehead's appeal to eternal objects in his explanation of the emergence of actual entities and to show that so long as one operates within his scheme of ideas no other consistent explanation is available. A thoroughgoing reconstruction of the scheme is necessary if this presupposition is to be eliminated. If the project is successful, it will be demonstrated that the theory of actual entities provides no basis for the explanation of the emergence of novel things, which is one of the major tenets of the organic philosophy. The argument will develop by way of an analysis of the theory of “physical relatedness.”