The recent philosophy of physics is confronted with the new ontology, as it emerges after philosophy proper has fully articulated the linguistic turn. The classical ontologists asserted or denied, controversially, that certain entities “existed.” Rather than adding to these controversies, the new ontology uncovers their dialectics. The ontologically problematic entities of physics are of two kinds, represented by forces and particles, respectively. The dialectics has been dominated by eight patterns. Two of these, independence and realism, belong to philosophy proper. The latter is here considered in order to relieve the philosophy of physics of a burden only philosophy proper can bear. That leaves six patterns: concreteness (including the orbit feature), acquaintance, simplicity, significance, process, and model. The paper sketches how each of these may be used and probably has been used, either explicitly or implicitly, in the recent controversies.

Two solutions are offered to the problem of distinguishing “historical” from “functional” associations in cross-cultural surveys. The underlying logic of the mathematical model is discussed and three kinds of association distinguished: hyperdiffusional or purely “historical” association, undiffusional or purely “functional” association, and semidiffusional or mixed “historical-functional” association. Two overland diffusion arcs constitute the test sample; the relationship of social stratification to political complexity constitutes the test problem. A sifting test establishes a bimodal distribution of interval lengths between like types and sifts out repetitions with a lesser interval length than the second mode. A cluster test shows that for the test problem, the “hits” cluster more than the “misses”.

A logic of questions and answers exists within the logic of statements, if we make the following identifications (roughly): “Whether” questions are identified with true exclusive disjunctions, and “which” questions are identified with true existential quantifications. The question-and-answer process is interpreted as an information-matching game. The question mark is not needed except as a device of abbreviation. Complete and partial answers can be distinguished and various relations of relevance, independence, and resolution defined.

In this note, we wish to remark on some of the relations between deciding one's own action and predicting one's own action. This topic is relevant both to current discussions of the nature of analysis and to the continuing controversy over the nature of scientific explanation.

Professor Leonard proposes that imperative and interrogative sentences be classified, together with declarative ones, as true and false. The interesting analysis he gives in connection with this proposal points out that these three types of utterance have something in common and has the merit of evincing the identity of this common element. Also it may seem to offer attractive possibilities of integrating various types of discourse in its promise of partial assimilation of interrogatives and imperatives to the model of truth-valuable language. Even so, Leonard's account is not altogether satisfactory. I shall not discuss his treatment of imperatives but shall argue that his conception of interrogatives has unacceptable consequences.

I am grateful to Professor Wheatley for his note, [3], on my analysis of interrogatives, [1]. His comments bring out very clearly a number of considerations that deserve our closest attention. For example, he shows that if we can classify interrogatives as true and false—as I proposed to do—then we can properly inquire about what sentences contradict them, and what sentences are contingently or logically equivalent to them. Furthermore, he shows that, on my analysis, no indirect question can contradict any other indirect question and he accordingly, and correctly, looks for such contradictories among declarative sentences. (Different considerations than any that Professor Wheatley brought out will equally well show that no direct question will contradict any other direct question: “Is Freeman Governor of Minnesota?” and “Is not Freeman Governor of Minnesota?” express different concerns with one and the same topic of concern, hence, are equivalent.) Finally, he notes, [3], p. 54, that in my article, I have treated only inquisitive questions and have said nothing about deliberative or practical questions. While practical questions (as well as their practical answers) demand a different kind of treatment than that which Wheatley speculatively, albeit very tentatively, extrapolates for me, still these questions do form a kind of interrogative that did not get any attention in my article. (But the problems are so complex that I shall not try to say anything about them in this Reply.)

One of the recurrent temptations in theory of knowledge is to try to provide an inductive justification for employing the principles of inductive inference. The purpose of the present paper is to suggest that this approach is misguided by exposing the deficiencies of what appears to be the most carefully constructed attempt of this kind which has thus far been made. I refer to the attempt made by R. B. Braithwaite in his Scientific Explanation.

The physics of the past half-century has thoroughly discredited the simple atomistic view that an ultimate explanation of all natural processes may be found in a mechanism of cause-and-effect relations among such clearly defined entities as point-like particles. And yet, physics and the other sciences continue to find nature to be orderly and lawful. How do we reconcile this breakdown of what once seemed to be the causal basis for the order of nature with the continued discovery of new manifestations of that order? The subject book [3] of this paper, written by the Professor of Theoretical Physics and Philosophy of Science at Buenos Aires University, may be considered to be a response to this question. There are many other things too in the book: it provides a much needed collecting, and sorting, of various questions that have been asked and answers that have been given with respect to causality. (The book could well serve as a textbook for a course on this topic.) There are statements in the book that may be justifiably criticised, as I hope later to show; but in all I believe that Professor Bunge has given us a work that makes a contribution of importance to philosophical discussions of causality.