“We get wise by asking questions, and even if these are not answered, we get wise; for a well packed question carries its answer on its back as a snail carries its shell.” These lines from James Stephens’ Irish Fairy Tales are an appropriate introduction, for Singer takes the question, ‘How shall I live if I would have of life the best it has to offer?’ as the departure for his ethics, or perhaps it would be fairer to say, for his reflections on ethical matters. This brief essay is expository and interpretive rather than critical and brings together material from various essays, particularly “Progress,” “On The Contented Life,” and “Old Ways and New Beginnings of Science and of Morals.”

Corrigibility has generally been designated as the major qualification of a scientific law. Although various other characteristics of a scientific law have been questioned, corrigibility has usually been accepted as one of its essential features. On this basis scientists, positivists, and pragmatists have frequently distinguished between genuine empirical laws and all other assertions that only seem to be laws. The mark of a genuine law in the scientific sense is its corrigibility; the mark of a pseudo law is its non-corrigibility. In this paper I should like to reopen philosophic inquiry into the nature of corrigibility as it is supposedly exemplified in law and to call attention to some of the peculiar difficulties and conclusions attendant on any such inquiry.

1. Objective of the Paper. This is an exercise in formalism; an attempt to see what a certain hypothesis would look like if it were spelled out in more detail than it has so far received. The object is to frame a self-consistent hypothesis that includes certain contributions of both optimism and pessimism. We would like to save the moral advantages of each position; at first glance they seem logically exclusive.

There are two parts to the paper. The first is concerned with the question: “are there law statements in any of the social sciences?” In order to answer this question two explanations drawn from the literature of anthropology and sociology are considered in detail. It is shown that these are “explanation sketches” rather than logically complete explanations. Both of these “sketches” presuppose but do not state tendency laws. These law statements are then made explicit by the writer, and thus it is shown that the use of law statements is assumed in at least some of the social sciences.

H. S. Sullivan's approach to the study of psychiatry reflects the fact that his conception of scientific method was derived from work in physics rather than in the biological sciences. His definition of psychiatry as the study of “interpersonal process” appears to have been influenced partly by his previous training in physics, and also by his conclusion that the most significant aspects of personality could be revealed only through an understanding of the person's actual behavior in relation to others.

Lately, an increased interest in formal devices has led to an attempt on the part of some mathematicians to do without those aspects of mathematics which require intuition. One consequence of this movement has been a new conception of pure mathematics as a science of axiomatic systems. According to this conception, there is no reality beyond an axiomatic system which the statements of mathematics are about; the fact that a statement is a theorem in the system is all that is of interest. This is a sort of nominalist position, since the contrary position seems to be committed to a belief in the existence of a domain of mathematical entities, which are just as suspect as the universale commonly discussed in metaphysical treatises. More often it is called formalism.

There has been much discussion in recent years of the possibilities for and nature of “value science.” The present paper is intended to be a contribution to this discussion. One encouraging feature of the bulk of current discussion of value science is that its protagonists have a definite end in view, namely, “human betterment,” taking that phrase in the common sense as covering, at least, a process of creating and maintaining such conditions of life as enable human beings successfully to engage in satisfying activities.

In his reexamination of the relationship between quality and quantity, Professor Plochmann has avoided the method of linguistic analysis in favor of a more traditional method of philosophizing. Since I agree with him that in general quality and quantity are irreducible one to the other, but may both be reducible to some category more fundamental than either, my comments are to be considered supplementary to his. In particular, I should like to see what clarifications, if any, arise if one considers qualities and quantities from the purely linguistic point of view.