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Abstract
This article raises two difficulties that certain approaches to causation have with would-cause counterfactuals. First, there is a problem with David Lewis's semantics of counterfactuals when we ‘suppose in’ some positive event of a certain kind. And, second, there is a problem with embedded counterfactuals. I show that causal-modeling approaches do not have these problems.
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- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
‡
I would like to thank Stephen Barker and Jonathan Schaffer for comments on some of this material.
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