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Who’s Afraid of the Base-Rate Fallacy?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 May 2025

Corey Dethier Open the ORCID record for Corey Dethier [Opens in a new window]
Corey Dethier*
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University of Minnesota
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Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper evaluates the back-and-forth between Mayo, Howson, and Achinstein over whether classical statistics commits the base-rate fallacy. I show that Mayo is correct to claim that Howson’s arguments rely on a misunderstanding of classical theory. I then argue that Achinstein’s refined version of the argument turns on largely undefended epistemic assumptions about “what we care about” when evaluating hypotheses. I end by suggesting that Mayo’s positive arguments are no more decisive than her opponents’: even if correct, they are unlikely to compel anyone not already sympathetic to the classical picture.

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Article
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Philosophy of Science , Volume 92 , Issue 2 , April 2025 , pp. 453 - 469
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© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association

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