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What is the Logical Form of Probability Assignment in Quantum Mechanics?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

John F. Halpin
John F. Halpin*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Oakland University
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Abstract

The nature of quantum mechanical probability has often seemed mysterious. To shed some light on this topic, the present paper analyzes the logical form of probability assignment in quantum mechanics. To begin the paper, I set out and criticize several attempts to analyze the form. I go on to propose a new form which utilizes a novel, probabilistic conditional and argue that this proposal is, overall, the best rendering of the quantum mechanical probability assignments. Finally, quantum mechanics aside, the discussion here has consequences for counterfactual logic, conditional probability, and epistemic probability.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 58 , Issue 1 , March 1991 , pp. 36 - 60
Copyright
Copyright © 1991 The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I want to thank Arthur Fine, Alan Nelson, two anonymous referees for Philosophy of Science, and, especially, Paul Teller for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. These were extremely valuable. Research for this paper was supported by a Faculty Research Grant from Oakland University.

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