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Was Cartesian Science ever Meant to be a Priori? A Comment on Hatfield

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Athanasse Raftopoulos
Athanasse Raftopoulos*
Affiliation:
New York College at Athens
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Abstract

In a recent article G. Hatfield claims that Descartes for a certain time thought a purely a priori science to be possible. Hatfield's evidence consists of his reading of the Cartesian method in the Regulae and of a letter to Mersenne, written in May 1632. I argue that Hatfield misinterprets the Cartesian method and Descartes' claim in the letter to Mersenne. I first show that the latter does not argue for an a priori science. Then, I show that the method of the Regulae is not a priori. Finally, I propose a reading of Descartes' letter.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 62 , Issue 1 , March 1995 , pp. 150 - 160
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1995

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Footnotes

†

This paper is the result of a long discussion with Dennis Des Chene, whose contribution, thus, is invaluable. I would like also to thank Stephen Barker for reading a draft of this paper and making some very helpful remarks.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, 18–20 Anthias Street, Ano Kypseli, Athens, 11364, Greece.

References

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