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Van Fraassen's Dissolution of Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Mathias Frisch
Mathias Frisch*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University
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Abstract

Bas van Fraassen has recently argued for a “dissolution” of Hilary Putnam's well-known model-theoretic argument. In this paper I argue that, as it stands, van Fraassen's reply to Putnam is unsuccessful. Nonetheless, it suggests the form a successful response might take.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 66 , Issue 1 , March 1999 , pp. 158 - 164
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, 1818 Hinman Ave, Evanston, IL 60208–1315.

‡

Most of the research for this paper was done during my stay as a visitor at the Centre for the Philosophy of the Natural and the Social Sciences at the London School of Economics during the 1997 Lent term. I wish to thank the members of the Centre for their hospitality and for many stimulating discussions. For detailed comments and criticisms on various earlier versions of this paper I want to thank Paul Horwich, Lisa Lloyd, Stathis Psillos, Gabriel Siegal, John Worrall, and two anonymous referees for Philosophy of Science.

References

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