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Using Meta-Scientific Studies to Clarify or Resolve Questions in the Philosophy and History of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

David Faust  and
Paul E. Meehl
David Faust*
Affiliation:
University of Rhode Island
Paul E. Meehl*
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota
*
Send requests for reprints to the authors. David Faust: Department of Psychology, 10 Chaffe Rd., Suite 8, Kingston, RI 02881. Paul Meehl: Department of Psychology, 75 E. River Rd., Elliot Hall, Minneapolis, MN 55455.
Send requests for reprints to the authors. David Faust: Department of Psychology, 10 Chaffe Rd., Suite 8, Kingston, RI 02881. Paul Meehl: Department of Psychology, 75 E. River Rd., Elliot Hall, Minneapolis, MN 55455.
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Abstract

More powerful methods for studying and integrating the historical track record of scientific episodes and scientific judgment, or what Faust and Meehl describe as a program of meta-science and meta-scientific studies, can supplement and extend more commonly used case study methods. We describe the basic premises of meta-science, overview methodological considerations, and provide examples of meta-scientific studies. Meta-science can help to clarify or resolve long-standing questions in the history and philosophy of science and provide practical help to the working scientist.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 69 , Issue S3 , September 2002 , pp. S185 - S196
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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