Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 January 2022
This paper discusses Millstein’s (2020) criticism of the consensus view formed against selected-effects ecological functions. I argue that Millstein’s defense of coevolution-based selected-effects ecological functions applies to a notion of function as an activity, whereas proponents of the consensus view are concerned with a notion of ecological function as the contribution of an organism, population, species, or abiotic item to the maintenance of its community and/or the functioning of its ecosystem. Millstein’s arguments hence do not invalidate the consensus view but draw attention to a notion of function that has been neglected in philosophical discussions and that deserves more attention.
The author is thankful to Roberta Millstein for a stimulating exchange on ecological functions, as well as to her, Justin Garson and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on previous versions of this manuscript. He also thanks Xander Selene and Alice Everly for editing the manuscript. The work for this paper was supported by a research grant from the Fonds de recherche du Québec – Société et culture (FRQSC, 2018-CH-211053).