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Two Grades of Evidential Bias

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Paul M. Churchland*
Affiliation:
University of Manitoba

Abstract

It is argued herein that there are two distinct ways in which all observation vocabularies are prejudiced with respect to theory. An argument based on the demands of adequate translation is invoked to show that even the simplest of our observation predicates must display the first and more obvious grade of bias—intensional bias. It is also argued that any observation vocabulary whose predicates are corrigibly applicable must manifest a second and equally serious grade of bias—extensional bias—independently of whatever intensional bias its predicates may or may not have.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1975 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

I should like to express my thanks to Leon Ellsworth, Robert Audi, and Steven Savitt for their helpful criticisms of an earlier draft.

References

REFERENCE

Goodman, N. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.Google Scholar