Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-p9bg8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-05T18:34:36.454Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Trust among Strangers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Cristina Bicchieri ,
John Duffy  and
Gil Tolle†
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The paper presents a simulation of the dynamics of impersonal trust. It shows how a “trust and reciprocate” norm can emerge and stabilize in populations of conditional cooperators. The norm, or behavioral regularity, is not to be identified with a single strategy. It is instead supported by several conditional strategies that vary in the frequency and intensity of sanctions.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 71 , Issue 3 , July 2004 , pp. 286 - 319
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

‡

We wish to thank Jason M. Alexander and two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions.

References

Axelrod, Robert (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Berg, Joyce, Dickhaut, John, and McCabe, Kevin (1995), “Trust, Reciprocity and Social History”, Trust, Reciprocity and Social History 10(1): 122–142.Google Scholar
Bicchieri, Cristina (1993), Rationality and Coordination. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Bicchieri, Cristina (forthcoming), The Grammar of Society. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, Colin (2003), Behavioral Game Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Cook, Karen (2001), Trust in Society. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.Google Scholar
Dasgupta, Partha (1988), “Trust as a Commodity”, in Gambetta, Diego (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Fehr, Ernst, Gachter, Simon, and Kirchsteiger, Georg (1997), “Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence”, Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence 65:833–860.Google Scholar
Foster, Dean, and Young, Peyton (1990), “Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics”, Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics 38(2): 219–232.Google Scholar
Fudenberg, Drew, and Harris, Christopher (1992), “Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks”, Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks 57(2): 420–441.Google Scholar
Fudenberg, Drew, and Maskin, Eric (1986), “The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information”, The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information 54:533–554.Google Scholar
Hofbauer, James, and Sigmund, Karl (1998), Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kreps, David (1990), “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory”, in Alt, James and Shepsle, Karl (eds.), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 90–143.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maynard Smith, John (1982), Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maynard Smith, John, and Price, Richard (1973), “The Logic of Animal Conflict”, The Logic of Animal Conflict 146:15–18.Google Scholar
Putnam, Robert (1993), Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Putnam, Robert (2000), Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster.Google Scholar
Samuelson, Larry (1997), Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Samuelson, Larry, and Zhang, Junfu (1992), “Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games”, Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games 57(2): 363–391.Google Scholar
Skyrms, Brian (1990), The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Skyrms, Brian (1996), Evolution of the Social Contract. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Skyrms, Brian (1997), “Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Dynamics”, in Bicchieri, Cristina, Jeffrey, Richard, and Skyrms, Brian (eds.), The Dynamics of Norms. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Van Damme, Eric (1991), Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yamagishi, Toshio, and Yamagishi, Midori (1994), “Trust and Commitment in the United States and Japan”, Trust and Commitment in the United States and Japan 18(2): 129–166.Google Scholar
Young, Peyton, and Foster, Dean (1991), “Cooperation in the Short and in the Long Run”, Cooperation in the Short and in the Long Run 3:145–156.Google Scholar