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Things, Relations and Identity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Edwin B. Allaire*
Affiliation:
University of Iowa

Abstract

Philosophers have long believed that if the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles were logically true, there would be no problem of individuation. I show (a) that if spatial relations are, as seems plausible, of such a nature that it makes no sense to say of one thing that it is related to itself, then the Principle is a logical truth, asserting that a certain kind of state of affairs is impossible because the kind of sentence purporting to express it is ill-formed and (b) that even if the Principle were such a truth the problem of individuation would remain. I then examine some of what Leibniz and Wittgenstein have said about the notions of individuation, difference and non-identity.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1967

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References

REFERENCES

[1] Allaire, Edwin B., “Another Look at Bare Particulars,” Philosophical Studies, 16. pp. 1621.10.1007/BF00398838CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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[6] Russell, Bertrand, “On the Relations of Universals and Particulars,” Logic and Knowledge, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1956, pp. 105124.Google Scholar
[7] Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Notebooks 1914–1916, Blackwell, 1961, p. 51e.Google Scholar