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The Thesis of Theory-Laden Observation in the Light of Cognitive Psychology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Anna Estany
Anna Estany*
Affiliation:
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Departament de Filosofia, Edifici B, Campus de las UAB, 08193 Bellaterra (Cerdanyola del Vallès), Barcelona, Spain
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze a philosophical question (neutrality vs. theoryladenness of observation) taking into consideration the empirical results of Cognitive Psychology (theories of perception). This is an important debate because the objectivity of science is at stake. In the Philosophy of Science there are two main positions with regard to observation, those of C. Hempel and N. R. Hanson. In the Philosophy of Mind there are also two important contrasting positions, those of J. Fodor and Paul M. Churchland. I will analyze the consequences of recent theories of perception and vision developed within Cognitive Science for classical epistemological theses about observation.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 68 , Issue 2 , June 2001 , pp. 203 - 217
Copyright
Copyright © 2001 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

An early version of this paper was read at the 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in the Jagiellonian University in August, 1999. I would like to thank the Ministry of Education of Spain for sponsoring this research project (PB95–0125-C06–05) and the Generalitat of Catalonia for the fellowship which allowed me to go to UCSD as a visiting scholar. I am also grateful to Patricia Churchland and Toni Domenech for their advice on drafting this paper and to Peter Gardenfors for his brief but fruitful suggestions about certain aspects of this paper.

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