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Theory-Dependent Terms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

David Papineau
David Papineau*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy King's College London
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, King's College, London, England WC2R 2LS.
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Abstract

The main puzzle about theoretical definitions is that nothing seems to decide which assumptions contribute to such definitions and which do not. I argue that theoretical definitions are indeed imprecise, but that this does not normally matter, since the definitional imprecision does not normally produce indeterminacy of referential value. Sometimes, however, the definitional imprecision is less benign, and does generate referential indeterminacy. In these special cases, but not otherwise, it is necessary to refine the term's definition.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue 1 , March 1996 , pp. 1 - 20
Copyright
Copyright © 1996 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

For help with this paper, I would like to thank Tad Brennan, Tim Crane, Michael Devitt, Keith Hossack, Sarah Patterson, Stathis Psillos, Murali Ramachandran, Mark Sainsbury, Barry Smith, Steven Stich, Scott Sturgeon, and Bernhard Weiss.

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