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Taking Reductionism to the Limit: How to Rebut the Antireductionist Argument from Infinite Limits

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Juha Saatsi  and
Alexander Reutlinger
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Abstract

This article analyzes the antireductionist argument from renormalization group explanations of universality and shows how it can be rebutted if one assumes that the explanation in question is captured by the counterfactual dependence account of explanation.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 85 , Issue 3 , July 2018 , pp. 455 - 482
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†.

We benefited from comments on earlier drafts of this work presented at the University of Guelph and at workshops at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität and Leeds, and especially from the extensive and very helpful comments by the two anonymous referees. The support of the Durham Emergence Project and John Templeton Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.

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