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Systems, Inquiry, and the Meanings of Falsification

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Ian I. Mitroff
Ian I. Mitroff*
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show that there are as many formulations of the process of falsification as there are archetypal, philosophical systems of inquiry. This paper explores several systems of inquiry which are based on Churchman's reading of the history of Western epistemology. It is argued that (1) the falsification of scientific theories can never be a purely formal process although it is perpetually open to formal exploration ; (2) that contrary to current belief, falsification can never be more certain than confirmation because falsification involves judgments which are no more certain than those involved in confirmation. The supposed asymmetry between confirmation and falsification is severely challenged. Finally, a Feyerabendian and a Hegelian notion of falsification are explicitly developed and contrasted.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 40 , Issue 2 , June 1973 , pp. 255 - 276
Copyright
Copyright © 1973 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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