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Supervenience and Computational Explanation in Vision Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Peter Morton
Peter Morton*
Affiliation:
Department of Humanities, Mount Royal College
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Abstract

According to Marr's theory of vision, computational processes of early vision rely for their success on certain “natural constraints” in the physical environment. I examine the implications of this feature of Marr's theory for the question whether psychological states supervene on neural states. It is reasonable to hold that Marr's theory is nonindividualistic in that, given the role of natural constraints, distinct computational theories of the same neural processes may be justified in different environments. But to avoid trivializing computational explanations, theories must respect methodological solipsism in the sense that within a theory there cannot be differences in content without a corresponding difference in neural states.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 60 , Issue 1 , March 1993 , pp. 86 - 99
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1993

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank G. Keith Humphrey, David Martens, and especially William Demopoulos for their helpful comments.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Humanities, Mount Royal College, Calgary, Alberta T3E 6K6, Canada.

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