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Stretched Lines, Averted Leaps, And Excluded Competition: A Theory of Scientific Counterfactuals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Gregory M. Mikkelson
Gregory M. Mikkelson*
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
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Abstract

Lewis' argument against the Limit Assumption and Pollock's Generalized Consequence Principle together suggest that “minimal-change” theories of counterfactuals are wrong. The “small-change” theories presented by Nute do not say enough. While these theories rely on closeness between possible worlds, I base an alternative on the ceteris paribus concept. My theory solves a problem that the above cannot, and is more relevant to the philosophy of science. Ceteris paribus conditions should normally include the causes, but exclude the effects, of the negated antecedent. An example from community ecology, the debate over null models in island-biogeographical studies of competition, supports these arguments.

Type
Causation and Explanation
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 1996. , 1996 , pp. S194 - S201
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

I thank Bill Wimsatt, Dave Walton, Scott Anderson, Marshall Abrams, Philip Robbins, Gunter Eble, Leigh Van Valen and Mathew Leibold for comments about this article.

‡

Committee on Conceptual Foundations of Science, University of Chicago, 5801 S. Ellis Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637.

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