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Strawson, Russell, and the King of France

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Herbert Hochberg*
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota

Abstract

It is argued that Strawson's celebrated attacks on Russell's views about proper names and descriptions are misleading and unfounded. An attempt is made to show that Strawson's alternative views are philosophically more problematic than Russell's. It is also argued that, properly stated, Russell's analyses do not do violence to ordinary usage and that attempts to justify Strawson's analysis on the ground that it fits better with ordinary usage are mistaken.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1970 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

[1] Strawson, P. F., “On Referring,” originally in Mind, 1950; reprinted in Essays in Conceptual Analysis, London, 1960.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Strawson, P. F., “Identifying Reference and Truth-values,” Theoria, vol. xxx, no. 2, 1964.Google Scholar
[3] Strawson, P. F., Introduction to Logical Theory, London, 1964.Google Scholar