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Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Ian Hacking
Ian Hacking*
Affiliation:
Makerere University College
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Abstract

A person required to risk money on a remote digit of π would, in order to comply fully with the theory [of personal probability] have to compute that digit, though this would really be wasteful if the cost of computation were more than the prize involved. For the postulates of the theory imply that you should behave in accordance with the logical implications of all that you know. Is it possible to improve the theory in this respect, making allowance within it for the cost of thinking, or would that entail paradox?

Type
A Panel Discussion of Personal Probability
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 34 , Issue 4 , December 1967 , pp. 311 - 325
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1967

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Footnotes

∗

L. J. Savage, “Difficulties in the Theory of Personal Probability,” in this issue of Philosophy of Science. Unless otherwise specified all references to Savage's work are to this article.

References

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