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Shocking Lessons from Electric Fish: The Theory and Practice of Multiple Realization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Brian L. Keeley
Brian L. Keeley*
Affiliation:
Pitzer College
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Pitzer College, 1050 North Mills Avenue, Claremont, CA 91711; email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between psychology and neurobiology in the context of cognitive science. Are the sciences that constitute cognitive science independent and theoretically autonomous, or is there a necessary interaction between them? I explore Fodor's Multiple Realization Thesis (MRT) which starts with the fact of multiple realization and purports to derive the theoretical autonomy of special sciences (such as psychology) from structural sciences (such as neurobiology). After laying out the MRT, it is shown that, on closer inspection, the argument is either circular or self-undermining—the argument either assumes the very autonomy it seeks to demonstrate or the concluded autonomy is contradicted by the theoretical interdependence invoked by the premises of the argument. Next, I explore a concrete example of multiple realization in the explanation of animal behavior: the convergent evolution of jamming avoidance behaviors in three genera of weakly electric fish. Contrary to the image painted by the MRT, the work on these animals involves a high degree of interaction between the various levels of investigation. The fact that our understanding of electric fish behavior involves functional theories and multiple realization without the kind of disunified science that is supposed to follow from such a situation indicates that the mere fact of multiple realization cannot be the basis for an autonomous psychology.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 67 , Issue 3 , September 2000 , pp. 444 - 465
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Portions of this paper are taken from the author's Ph.D. dissertation, written under the supervision of Sandra Mitchell and Patricia Churchland at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD), and finished in 1997. Early versions of this paper were presented to the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, and to the Philosophy/Neuroscience/Psychology Program at Washington University in St. Louis. John Bickle provided me with insightful suggestions; the last section of the paper would not have occurred without his input. Thanks also to an anonymous reviewer for this journal. Masashi Kawasaki, Calvin Wong, K.T. Moortgat, and Ted Bullock all provided feedback on the scientific details. However, any remaining errors are my responsibility. This work was supported by grants from the National Institute of Mental Health (NRSA #1 F31 MH10676–01), the McDonnell-Pew Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, and the UCSD Department of Philosophy.

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