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Scientific/Intellectual Movements Remedying Epistemic Injustice: The Case of Indigenous Studies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Inkeri Koskinen  and
Kristina Rolin
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Abstract

Whereas much of the literature in the social epistemology of scientific knowledge has focused either on scientific communities or research groups, we examine the epistemic significance of scientific/intellectual movements (SIMs). We argue that certain types of SIMs can play an important epistemic role in science: they can remedy epistemic injustices in scientific practices. SIMs can counteract epistemic injustices effectively because many forms of epistemic injustice require structural and not merely individual remedies. To illustrate our argument, we discuss the case of indigenous studies.

Type
Ethics, Values, and Social Epistemology
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 86 , Issue 5 , December 2019 , pp. 1052 - 1063
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

*

To contact the authors, please write to: Inkeri Koskinen, Tampere University; e-mail: [email protected]. Kristina Rolin, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies; e-mail: [email protected].

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