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Science, Publicity, and Consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Alvin I. Goldman
Alvin I. Goldman*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, P.O. Box 210027, Tucson, AZ 85721-0027.
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Abstract

A traditional view is that scientific evidence can be produced only by intersubjective methods that can be used by different investigators and will produce agreement. This intersubjectivity, or publicity, constraint ostensibly excludes introspection. But contemporary cognitive scientists regularly rely on their subjects' introspective reports in many areas, especially in the study of consciousness. So there is a tension between actual scientific practice and the publicity requirement. Which should give way? This paper argues against the publicity requirement and against a fallback version of it, viz. that evidence-conferring methods must at least have their reliability publicly validated.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue 4 , December 1997 , pp. 525 - 545
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1997

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Footnotes

‡

Some of the research for this paper was done under the sponsorship of the University of Pittsburgh Center for Philosophy of Science, which I gratefully acknowledge. Various earlier versions of the paper were given at the University of Pittsburgh, Southern Methodist University, Bowling Green State University, University of Arizona (Cognitive Science Program), and University of Arkansas. Audience comments at all of these forums were helpful. I am especially indebted to Philip Kitcher, Christopher Hill, Paul Bloom, William Lycan, Gerald Massey, Mary Peterson, Joel Pust, and three anonymous referees for Philosophy of Science.

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