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Science and Core Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Susan Carey  and
Elizabeth Spelke
Susan Carey
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, New York University
Elizabeth Spelke
Affiliation:
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Abstract

While endorsing Gopnik's proposal that studies of the emergence and modification of scientific theories and studies of cognitive development in children are mutually illuminating, we offer a different picture of the beginning points of cognitive development from Gopnik's picture of “theories all the way down.” Human infants are endowed with several distinct core systems of knowledge which are theory-like in some, but not all, important ways. The existence of these core systems of knowledge has implications for the joint research program between philosophers and psychologists that Gopnik advocates and we endorse. A few lessons already gained from this program of research are sketched.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue 4 , December 1996 , pp. 515 - 533
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

Send reprint requests to the authors, S. Carey, Department of Psychology, New York University, 6 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003; E. Spelke, Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02139.

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