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Rule-Following and the Evolution of Basic Concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Jeffrey A. Barrett
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Abstract

This article concerns how rule-following behavior might evolve, how an old evolved rule might come to be appropriated to a new context, and how simple concepts might coevolve with rule-following behavior. In particular, we consider how the transitive inferential rule-following behavior exhibited by pinyon and scrub jays might evolve in the context of a variety of the Skyrms-Lewis signaling game, then how such a rule might come to be appropriated to carry out inferences regarding stimuli different from those involved in the original evolution of the rule, and how this appropriation involves a step toward the evolution of basic ordinal concepts.

Type
Signaling Theory in Biological and Cognitive Sciences
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 81 , Issue 5 , December 2014 , pp. 829 - 839
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Brian Skyrms and Cailin O’Connor for discussions on the topic of this article and an anonymous reviewer for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft.

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