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The Role of Genidentity In The Causal Theory of Time

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Ronald C. Hoy
Ronald C. Hoy*
Affiliation:
California State College, Pennsylvania
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Abstract

A recent version of the causal theory of time makes crucial use of a concept of the genidentity of events when it attempts to define temporal betweenness in terms of empirical, physical properties. By presenting and discussing an apparent counterexample it is argued that the role of genidentity in an empirical theory of time is problematic. In particular, it may be that the temporal behavior of objects is used to decide which events are genidentical, and, if so, the definition of temporal betweenness is circular. On the other hand, though there are strategies for avoiding the charge of circularity, in certain hypothetical situations the definition may yield inconsistent temporal orders. Then, the definition would have to be supplemented by a choice of temporal orders, and this choice may introduce an element of conventionality into the causal theory of time.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 42 , Issue 1 , March 1975 , pp. 11 - 19
Copyright
Copyright © 1975 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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