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Rhetoric, Induction, and the Free Speech Dilemma

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla
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Abstract

Scientists can choose different claims as interpretations of the results of their research. Scientific rhetoric is understood as the attempt to make those claims most beneficial for the scientists’ interests. A rational choice, game-theoretic model is developed to analyze how this choice can be made and to assess it from a normative point of view. The main conclusion is that ‘social’ interests (pursuit of recognition) may conflict with ‘cognitive’ ones when no constraints are put on the choices of the authors of scientific papers, as in an ‘ideal free speech situation’. Scientific institutions may help to solve this conflict. Lastly, some empirical predictions are offered that can inspire future social research of the refereeing process.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 73 , Issue 2 , April 2006 , pp. 175 - 193
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Financial support from Fundación Urrutia Elejalde and from Spanish government's research projects PB98-0495-C08-01 and BFF2002-03353 is acknowledged. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the fourth congress of the Spanish Society of Logic and Philosophy of Science, and at the seventh congress of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. Comments and corrections were received from Max Albert, Paco Álvarez, Christian List, Uskali Mäki, and Pascual Martínez Freire, as well as from two anonymous referees.

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