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Responsiveness and Robustness in the David Lewis Signaling Game

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Carl Brusse  and
Justin Bruner
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Abstract

We consider modifications to the standard David Lewis signaling game and relax a number of unrealistic implicit assumptions that are often built into the framework. In particular, we motivate and explore various asymmetries that exist between the sender and receiver roles. We find that endowing receivers with a more realistic set of responses significantly decreases the likelihood of signaling, while allowing for unequal selection pressure often has the opposite effect. We argue that the results of this article can also help make sense of a well-known evolutionary puzzle regarding the absence of an evolutionary arms race between sender and receiver in conflict-of-interest signaling games.

Type
Biology
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 84 , Issue 5 , December 2017 , pp. 1068 - 1079
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

We thank Kim Sterelny, Ron Planer, and the audiences at the Sydney-ANU Philosophy of Biology Workshop, the Australasian Association of Philosophy 2016 conference, the ANU Evo Theory reading group, and the 2016 Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association.

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