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Rescuing Reflection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Ilho Park
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Abstract

In this article, I suggest an argument that seems to show a conflict between the reflection principle and conditionalization. In particular, I show that when the reflection principle is formulated in a standard way, the principle conflicts with Jeffrey conditionalization. And it is argued that the source of the conflict resides in an ambiguity of the standard formulation. Furthermore, I attempt to rescue the principle using Bayes factors. That is, I suggest a new formulation of the principle so as to avoid the conflict.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 79 , Issue 4 , October 2012 , pp. 473 - 489
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their invaluable suggestions. And I owe special debts to Inkyo Chung and Alan Hájek for their detailed and insightful comments.

References

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