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Reply to Philip Kitcher

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Helen E. Longino
Helen E. Longino*
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Philosophy Department, 831 Heller Hall, 271 19th Ave South, Minneapolis, MN 55455; [email protected].
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Philosophy of Science , Volume 69 , Issue 4 , December 2002 , pp. 573 - 577
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Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

1. If I were to rewrite The Fate of Knowledge I would probably devote less space to demonstrating how pervasive the rational-social dichotomy is. I thought it important to do so, given how unconsciously scholars of science rely on it. And a version of the dichotomy seems still alive and well in Science, Truth and Democracy (cf. pp. 38–41). But my main goal is to show that we must and can do without it.

2. For an extended discussion, see my forthcoming “Theoretical Pluralism and the Scientific Study of Human Behavior” (in Stephen Kellert, Helen Longino, and C. Kenneth Waters (eds,), Scientific Pluralism, forthcoming).

3. In my latitudinarian view the Millian problem is not about the truth, but about all the possible significant truths (or conforming representations).